Backtesting the efficiency of MNB’s Lending Survey by Ákos Bakonyi & Dániel Homolya
INTRODUCTION: MOTIVATION AND THE
RELATED LITERATURE
Magyar Nemzeti Bank launched its semi-annual Senior Loan
Officer’s Survey (SLO
1) in 2003, with the objective of
obtaining additional data on lending processes in Hungary
besides raw figures, similarly to the practice of other major
foreign central banks (FED, ECB, Bank of England, Bank of
Japan, etc.).
2 In the context of the survey, we examine the
household (housing and consumer) and corporate segments
(‘normal’ corporate financing and commercial real estate
loans), as well as the municipal segment since the beginning
of 2008, earlier on a semi-annual basis and on a quarterly
basis since 2009 Q1. In the survey we requested information
from banks and leasing companies regarding loan supply and
demand, credit conditions and the developments in portfolio
quality. Although several previous analyses based on data
from abroad came to the conclusion that a significant
relationship can be established between the tightening of
credit conditions and the slowdown in lending dynamics, as
well as slowing GDP growth indirectly, many still question
the usability of SLO surveys in forecasting lending processes.
In the article, based on available data in relation to the
Hungarian practice we examine to what extent the
qualitative answers given in the SLO survey can help
decision-makers with monetary and financial stability-related
decisions. The main motivation of the article is that over five
years worth of SLO data are now available, and although it
cannot be considered a sufficient sample due to the semi-
annual frequency, it nevertheless allows the examination of
certain correlations. An important characteristic of the period
under review is the deepening of the Hungarian banking
sector’s loan-based intermediation, which appeared primarily
in the increase in household loan portfolios. Before analysing
Hungarian data, we will summarise the related literature. 
Three areas can be distinguished where SLO surveys can help
decision-makers. On the one hand, they provide information
about the credit market’s non-price factors and their
evolution, and thus banks’ loan supply behaviour and risk
sensitivity. On the other, if the correlation between
developments in credit conditions, loan portfolio’s pace of
growth and change in GDP (with a certain lag) is in fact
strong, then SLO answers may improve the accuracy of
forecasts regarding lending and output. Furthermore, SLO is
a possible instrument for independently examining the
factors pertaining to loan demand and supply. The question’s
relevance stems from the fact that the slowing of the loan
portfolio’s dynamics in itself does not allow any conclusions
to be drawn concerning whether the slowdown is due to a
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This article briefly presents the general practice of lending surveys aimed at revealing loan supply behaviour, as well as the
literature analysing their usability. The focus of our analysis is the so-called Lending Survey (SLO), conducted by the MNB
since 2003. In the context of our backtesting based on data available up to December 2008, we examined whether there
were any contradictions in banks’ responses and how usable the results were from the perspective of lending and growth
forecasts. Based on the results, it can be established that banks are consistent in their answers, so there is a strong
relationship between their forward-looking and subsequent, retrospective answers. The correlation between the changes in
lending standards and the volume of loan portfolios is weak. This is due to the fact that in the Hungarian banking sector
the increase in loan portfolios over the past five years may have been influenced not only by supply-side behaviour, but also
by demand for loans and economic growth to a great extent. We also examined the correlation between changes in corporate
lending standards and GDP growth, which proved to be significant. Nevertheless, we cannot draw conclusions about the
direction of the cause and effect relationship based solely on the establishment of correlation, in other words about whether
banks act procyclically or whether corporate lending behaviour plays a decisive role in economic growth. The strength of
our analysis is limited by the brevity of the available time series and by the fact that we were unable to observe the entire
loan cycle during the period under review. Later, with the expansion of the Lending Survey’s data series, it will be
worthwhile to pursue our examination.
Ákos Bakonyi and Dániel Homolya: Backtesting
the efficiency of MNB’s Lending Survey
1 We use the expressions Lending Survey and SLO alternately in the article, with reference to the MNB’s “Senior Loan Officer Survey on Bank Lending Practices”
questionnaire-based survey. 
2 A brief comparison with international lending surveying practices is included in the Annex.drop in loan demand caused by a slowing economy or
whether it is due to banks’ decreasing loan supply. In the case
of the latter, there may still be several reasons: either banks
would wish to lend, but are unable to access sufficient funds
(credit crunch), or – having recognised the increased risks –
banks rationalise their lending by tightening their credit
standards; in other words, they are only willing to lend to
clients with better creditworthiness (credit rationing). The
qualitative information compiled by the SLO survey helps to
distinguish between these options and to determine the main
factors behind lending processes. The backtesting of this
information is especially relevant because in the current
financial crisis one of the heralding signs of the problems
afflicting financial markets was the introduction of significant
tightening measures by commercial banks in developed
countries during the course of 2007. 
Until the 1980s, the view that the financial intermediary
system played an important role in real economic activity was
not broadly accepted. Irving Fischer was the first to claim
that the Great Depression in 1929 was primarily caused by a
series of erroneous monetary policy decisions. The
‘revolution’ came in the 1980s with the rise of information
economics. Thanks to the rapid development of
econometrics and other instruments of analysis, economists
could demonstrate the real economic effects of lending and
interest rates.
This connection materialised in practice in the credit crisis of
1990, in the Asian-Russian crisis of 1997-98 and in the
current crisis, when the drying up of credit creates negative
fallout on the real economy. Berger and Udell (2003) found
that credit markets are procyclical, i.e. they reinforce the
swings in economic cycles. During periods of economic
upswing, banks’ risk sensitivity diminishes and they lend to
clients who would be considered too risky under normal
circumstances (see the subprime mortgage market). Banks
typically grant the lowest rated loans at the end of the
economic upswing. The other end of the spectrum is the
credit crunch, in which the economy – already burdened by
difficulties – is further weakened by the fact that well-
functioning, creditworthy companies are unable to access
loans. There may be several reasons behind this procyclical
behaviour. On the one hand, banks’ excessive risk aversion or
risk assumption in function of the cycle, the similar cyclical
changes in the capital situation, short-term profit
maximisation and an unhealthy level of competition between
banks may be responsible. Berger and Udell’s answer to the
question is the so-called institutional memory theory,
according to which the risk sensitivity of senior loan officers
gradually decreases as they draw farther away from the last
recession, until the next downturn. Chart 1 illustrates the
above findings and reveals that recessions in the US economy
over the past nearly two decades have been preceded by a
tightening of credit standards, a decline in the perceived loan
demand and a slowdown in lending.
It is important to distinguish between credit standards and
credit conditions when examining loan supply behaviour.
Although the two often become muddled in practice, in the
past we have used the two notions separately in the MNB’s
surveying practice due to their differing content. Credit
standards define the type of borrower a bank extends loans
to based on various criteria (segment, company size,
geographical location), as well as the types of loan it extends
to the various groups (for example only secured loans to
certain segments). In contrast, credit conditions are the set of
price (spread, risk premium, fees) and non-price factors (loan
to value ratio, covenant requirements).
3 Non-price factors
play an important role in forming lending tendencies on the
credit market. A good example is the aforementioned credit
rationing. When banks want to decrease their lending
activity, they stop increasing interest rates after a certain
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3 For the sake of easier answering, since the beginning of 2009 we have also inquired about changes in credit conditions and standards jointly. 
Chart 1
Correlation between the answers given to the FED’s
Lending Survey regarding the corporate segment,
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Note: The areas shaded in grey represent the periods when the US economy
was in recession. The chart shows the difference between the proportion of
banks signalling tightening and those signalling easing of credit standards,
while in the case of loan demand, it shows the difference between the
proportion of those who perceived growth and those who perceived
decline.
Source: Fed.point and tighten credit conditions instead. They can thus
avoid the negative effects of interest rate hikes: namely
higher interest rates pushing borrowers towards riskier
behaviour and riskier clients being the ones who take out new
loans (as higher interest payment can only be paid with
higher profitability, which in turn requires riskier activity).
Both effects would have negative consequences on the loan
portfolio’s quality, therefore banks prefer to tighten non-
price factors instead.
Over the past one and a half years, the greatest risk to the
global financial system has been the subprime mortgage
crisis and all its consequences. In their article, Ariccia et al.
(2008) demonstrated that the easing of credit standards and
conditions was the main motor of the extensive lending
boom of recent years in the US. The current crisis reinforces
the view that non-price factors play an important role in
lending and economic processes, and that these factors
should be taken into consideration when preparing
forecasts. 
As of this point, our analysis examines the efficiency of the
MNB Lending Survey and its usability as an instrument of
‘early forecasting’. First, we analyse the internal consistency
of SLO answers, in other words the relationship between
forecasted SLO answers and retrospective SLO answers given
in the course of the subsequent survey. Second, we examine
the relationship between SLO answers and actual lending
data. Finally, we analyse the Lending Survey’s forecasting
capability, i.e. we examine whether any relationship can be
established between forward-looking SLO answers and the
lending and GDP data observed in the subsequent periods.
BACKTESTING METHODOLOGY
4
The answers given in the course of the Lending Survey
range on a scale from one to five and express in a
qualitative manner the steps taken, planned or expected by
institutions regarding willingness to lend, loan demand,
credit standards/conditions, risk parameters and the risk
perception of various sectors. For example, in the case of
credit conditions, 1 represents significant tightening, 
2 represents some tightening, 3 represents no change, 4
represents some easing, while 5 represents significant
easing. In the case of answers expressing quantitative
factors (loan demand, willingness to lend), 1 represents
significant growth, 2 represents some growth, 3 represents
no change, 4 represents some decline, while 5 represents
significant decline. 
We used the net change indicator when aggregating answers.
The net proportion of respondents reporting tightening, for
example, is obtained by deducting the proportion of
respondents reporting loosening from those indicating
tightening. In the past we employed equal weighting in the
publication of the survey’s results, i.e. answers given by
smaller banks had the same value as those given by larger
banks. In contrast, in this analysis and in future lending
surveys, we weight SLO answers according to market share in
outstanding loan amount in the publication of results (unless
otherwise stated).
Regarding the qualitative nature of SLO answers, we sought
econometric tools which were suitable for examining the
strength of a relationship between variables measured on two
ordinal scales or on one ordinal and one interval scale. The
Pearson correlation coefficient examines the relationship
between two variables measured on interval scales; it can
therefore only be used in our case regarding aggregate
answers. In contrast, rank correlation can also be used in the
case of ordinal scales, accordingly we use two versions of it
(Spearman’s rho and Kendall’s tau) for analysing individual
bank answers.
With the help of rank correlation, we examine whether any
significant relationship can be established between the order
of data in the two time series. The relationship between two
variables is considered strong if the relationship has a
significance of 5% based on both variables. Similarly to the
‘traditional’ linear correlation indicator, Spearman’s rho and
Kendall’s tau both vary between -1 and +1; the bigger the
absolute value of the given indicator, the stronger the
relationship. A value of +1 corresponds to perfect
correlation, while -1 represents perfectly opposing
correlation. In the tables presented further below,
significance reflects the probability that the value of the
given indicator is zero, i.e. that there is no relationship
between the two time series. 
As only 12 data items are available per bank for each factor
(the survey has been carried out since 2003 on a semi-
annual basis, with the last observation being the data from
the survey conducted in July 2008), we consider individual
bank answers independent variables, i.e. we analyse each
individual bank answer in one time series. Of course the
assumption of independence may be tainted due to the
mutual effects of market actors on each other; however,
this approach may increase the significance of the
measured correlations due to the increased number of
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4 In the tables of the following chapters, we generally only present significant relations. The analysis encompasses the examination of lending survey data available up
to December 2008.observations in the time series. Consequently, the results of
this analysis primarily allow the introduction of test
research outcomes. 
Before presenting the results in greater detail, we would like
to remark that in the course of our analysis we only examined
household and corporate lending, as the municipality
segment has only been surveyed since January 2008 in the
context of the Lending Survey. Accordingly, we examine the
answers of four subsegments: consumer and housing lending,
corporate lending and commercial real estate lending.
CONSISTENCY BETWEEN FORWARD-
LOOKING SLO ANSWERS AND THE
RETROSPECTIVE SLO ANSWERS GIVEN
IN THE SUBSEQUENT SURVEY
In the Lending Survey we inquired retrospectively about the
previous half-year and in a forward-looking manner about
the upcoming half-year regarding most parameters. Overall,
based on the analysis it can be declared that forward-looking
and retrospective SLO answers are consistent with each
other: the relationship between the answers given regarding
credit standards is significant at 5% in all of the four loan
categories, and in three out of four cases in answers regarding
loan demand. 
Furthermore, answers regarding housing price movements in
the case of housing loans and answers regarding fees and
spreads in the case of corporate loans are consistent with
themselves.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
RETROSPECTIVE SLO ANSWERS AND
ACTUALLY OBSERVED CREDIT
CONDITIONS 
In the lending survey of MNB, we inquired in a qualitative
manner about lending parameters in relationship to which
specific numerical data were available. These include changes
in credit spreads (the part of loan interest in excess of the cost
of funds) in the case of consumer, housing and corporate
lending, as well as changes in the employed maximum loan-
to-value ratio (popularly referred to as LTV in the banking
industry) of housing loans. Contrary to our expectations, we
found no statistically significant relationship, which may be
due to two reasons: on the one hand, the low number of
sample elements, and, on the other, the fact that the
deepening of lending went hand in hand almost continuously
with the easing of credit conditions, which may distort
answers. 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SLO ANSWERS
AND THE ACTUAL LENDING AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH DATA OF THE
SUBSEQUENT PERIOD
In light of the research outcomes based on the FED’s Lending
survey, our hypothesis is that answers given regarding credit
conditions and standards appear in the developments in the
observed credit conditions, among which data are available on
spreads above the cost of funds and loan-to-value (LTV) ratios,
and are reflected in the changes in lending dynamics and
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Note: Parameters are measured on a scale from 1 to 5, as described above. In the case of credit standards and conditions, 1 represents significant
tightening, while 5 represents significant easing. In the case of willingness to lend, loan demand and housing prices, 1 represents a significant increase,
while 5 represents a significant decrease. A description of Spearman-rho and Kendall-tau indicators is available on page 8. 
Lending segment Parameters Spearman’s rho Spearman’s rho  Kendall’s tau Kendall’s tau Number of
significance significance elements
Credit standards 33.8% 0.2% 30.7% 0.2% 82
Housing loans Credit demand 24.9% 2.4% 21.6% 2.2% 82
Housing prices 21.2% 5.5% 20.1% 5.5% 82
Consumer loans
Credit standards 28.7% 0.3% 26.2% 0.3% 109
Credit demand 29.4% 0.2% 25.6% 0.2% 109
Credit standards 29.9% 0.8% 28.0% 0.9% 77
Corporate loans Credit fees 23.6% 3.9% 22.7% 3.9% 77
Credit spreads 37.2% 0.1% 35.7% 0.1% 77
Commercial real Credit standards 22.6% 4.9% 21.4% 4.7% 77
estate loans Credit demand 32.5% 0.4% 25.6% 0.4% 77
Table 1
Consistency between answers in the Lending Survey based on rank correlation indicatorseconomic growth with a certain lag. Based on our results, we
cannot say in general that individual bank forecasting SLO
answers and actual lending data comove significantly. We will
first present the results obtained and then give a possible
explanation as to why there are no significant results as of yet. 
In the case of credit conditions, we found certain statistical
correlations regarding housing loans which may seem
surprising. In this segment, there is a very strong covariance
between forward-looking answers regarding loan demand and
changes in the average semi-annual HUF interest margin. The
relationship between forecasted demand and changes in the
proportion of housing loans with an LTV of over 70% within
the portfolio is of medium strength, and the negative
correlation coefficient signifies that the proportion of loans
with an LTV of over 70% is increasing in parallel with demand. 
In line with the usual backtesting practice of lending surveys,
we also examined whether there is any significant
relationship between the increase in loans, changes in
willingness to lend and the tightening or easing of credit
standards. Chart 2 and Chart 3 allow the visual inspection of
the relationship between the growth in loans and credit
standards. The charts illustrate that in the household
segment, banks have given accounts of quasi continuous
easing or slight tightening since the survey was first
introduced, while in the corporate segment, the major market
actors, based on their accounts, have continuously tightened
their conditions further since June 2007. The pertaining
chart does not reveal any tendency-like relationship at first
glance (mainly due to the brevity of the time series), which
nevertheless in itself does not mean there is no statistically
measurable relationship. Accordingly, the statistical results
are worth presenting. 
In the course of the analysis, we examined the relationship
between changes in past and forward-looking credit
standards and future (T+1 half year, and T+2 half years)
loan growth. In former surveying practice, retrospective
data were available on changes in willingness to lend,
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Note: Parameters are measured on a scale from 1 to 5, as described above. In the case of credit conditions, and therefore spreads and LTV, 1 represents
significant tightening, while 5 represents significant easing. In the case of loan demand, 1 represents a significant increase, while 5 represents a significant
decrease. A description of Spearman-rho and Kendall-tau indicators is available on page 8. 
Parameter 1 Parameter 2 Spearman’s  Spearman  Kendall’s Kendall’s tau  Number of 
rho significance tau significance elements
Housing loans
Demand Forint spread -32.9% 0.4% -25.2% 0.5% 74
Demand 70%+LTV -24.2% 5.8% -19.2% 5.6% 62
Table 2
Forecasting capacity of SLO answers
Chart 2
Developments in standards of creditworthiness and
exchange rate filtered quarterly net borrowing on
the housing and consumer loan market (net
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Developments in standards of creditworthiness in
the corporate segment (net proportion of
respondents reporting tightening, equally weighted
answers) and the annual growth rate of the loan
portfolio 
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Source: MNB.therefore we examine the relationship thereof with future
loan growth. To measure changes in the lending portfolio,
we used exchange rate filtered, moving average (to exclude
seasonal effects) net borrowing in the case of household
lending, as using growth rates would be misleading due to
the potential distortion of the so-called base effect. With
corporate lending, we applied annual growth rates
pertaining to exchange rate filtered portfolios (thereby
excluding seasonal effects). As aggregate Lending Survey
data appear as percentages on a continuous scale between -
1 and 1, the linear correlation coefficient can be used when
analysing them, as described above. The strength of our
analysis is limited by the shortness of the available time
series and by the fact that during the period under review,
we did not observe the whole loan cycle. 
Household loans
In the course of our analyses, we did not find any significant
relationship between credit standards and changes in
willingness to lend, and the increase in the loan portfolio in
the household lending segment (housing and consumer
lending). The forecasted tightening measures showed same-
direction covariance with the larger degree of loan growth,
i.e. a further loan growth could be observed despite
tightening. Regarding household lending, the shortness of the
time series was probably responsible for the relatively few
significant relations between variables on the one hand, while
the deepening of financial intermediation in the Hungarian
economy should also be taken into account on the other.
Based on the lack of significant relations, we can conclude
that other factors besides supply side behaviour, for example
demand and economic convergence (i.e. in the case of a
converging economy) play a role in the evolution of the
credit market’s equilibrium. 
Corporate loans
Examining corporate lending, we found stronger results,
more in line with our preliminary expectations compared to
household lending. As illustrated by Table 3, the net
proportion of respondents carrying out tightening shows
opposite movement compared to the loan portfolio’s pace
of growth; in other words, the more respondents tighten
their lending, the lower the loan portfolio’s level of growth.
In addition, the lower part of the table shows that an
increase in the willingness to lend comoves with the
increase in the loan portfolio. Although these results are in
line with our intuitions, they are statistically not significant
due to the short review period. We also obtained similar
results based on the data considering individual bank
observations. 
In foreign SLO backtesting practice, correlations with GDP
growth are usually also examined besides relationship with
loan aggregates. The answers regarding corporate loan
supply behaviour and domestic GDP growth yield a
statistically significant relationship despite the short time
series. Table 4 shows that every analysed relationship (both
retrospective and forward-looking, between standards,
changes in willingness to lend and GDP growth) is significant.
In other words, tightening by banks covariates with a
decrease in GDP, while the increase in willingness to lend
covaries with an increase in GDP. Obviously, we cannot
conclude from this simple correlation analysis which factor
moves the other, i.e. whether banks behave procyclically
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Variables examined Correlation Level of significance Number of observations
Standards (net proportion Growth (changes in
of respondents  the loan portfolio)
reporting tightening)
Past Future (T+1) -27.5% 38.7% 12
Forecast Future (T+1) -18.2% 57.2% 12
Forecast Future (T+2) -49.5% 12.1% 11
Table 3
Forecasting ability of SLO answers in the case of corporate loans 
Variables examined Correlation Level of significance Number of observations
Willingness (net proportion GDP growth rate
of those with increasing
willingness)
Past Future (T+1) 38.7% 21.4% 12
Past Future (T+2) 52.0% 10.1% 11(easing their conditions during upswings and tightening them
during economic downturns) or whether corporate loan
supply behaviour significantly influences economic growth.
This is further reinforced by the fact that we also obtain a
strongly significant correlation if we examine the relationship
between the previous period’s GDP growth and corporate
credit standards and willingness to lend.
5
CONCLUSIONS
In our analysis we presented the main characteristics of the
Lending Survey conducted by the MNB and analysed the
consistency of SLO answers with themselves and with actual
data, as well as their forecasting ability. Based on the
econometric analysis, it can be concluded that banks forecast
their subsequent behaviour effectively, i.e. they are consistent
in their answers. At the same time, no significant relationship
can be observed with the changes in loan aggregates. The
signs of correlation indicators in the case of corporate
lending are in line with our expectations, that is to say the
tightening of credit standards goes hand in hand with a
decrease in loan portfolios. The relationship with household
loans was contrary to our expectations, which may partly be
due to the shortness of the time series and partly to the
deepening of financial intermediation and the importance of
demand-side factors besides loan supply behaviour. We
examined the relationship between changes in corporate
lending standards and GDP growth, which proved to be
significant. We found that tightened lending covaries with a
decrease in GDP in both a retrospective and forward-looking
manner, while increased willingness to lend goes hand in
hand with an increase in GDP. Nevertheless, we cannot draw
conclusions on the cause and effect relationship or its
direction from the sole fact of observed covariance, that is on
whether banks behave procyclically or whether economic
growth is significantly influenced by corporate loan supply
behaviour or whether there are joint explanatory factors. The
strength of our analysis is limited by the shortness of the
available time series and by the fact that we were unable to
observe the entire loan cycle during the period under review.
Later, with the expansion of the Lending Survey’s data series,
it will be worthwhile to pursue our examination. 
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ANNEX: THE INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE
OF LENDING SURVEYS
As mentioned in the article’s introduction, the Magyar
Nemzeti Bank Lending Survey practice is in line with similar
surveys conducted by other central banks. Table 5 shows the
main characteristics of the Lending Surveys carried out by the
central banks in the United Kingdom, Japan, Lithuania and
Poland, the European Central Bank and the US central bank,
the Federal Reserve.
6
The surveying practices mainly converge from the
perspective of questions. At the same time, their processing
methodology and the segments examined may differ based on
the size of the given banking sector.
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6 Besides these central banks, according to our knowledge the Turkish central bank also conducts a survey examining loan supply tendencies
(http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/ucaylik/bankakrean/bankakreaneyeni.html).MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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Table 5
Characteristics of the Lending Surveys of central banks
Magyar 
Nemzeti Bank 
(central bank of 
Hungary)
Bank of England Bank of Japan ECB Fed Bank of 
Lithuania
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market share of 
75-85%
TOP 50 banks 
are queried, 
accounting 
for 74% of the 
market (the list is 





Most recently 52 
domestic banks 
and 21 foreign 
bank branches/ 
“agencies” 
11 banks 24 banks, 75.9% 












as of March 2009)
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use of country 
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the EU














to easing or 
tightening
Link to 
publication
http://www.mnb.
hu/engine.spx?
page=mnbhu_
hitelezesi_
felmeres
http://www.
bankofengland.
co.uk/
publications/
other/monetary/
creditconditions.
htm
http://www.boj.
or.jp/en/theme/
research/stat/dl/
zan/loos/index.
htm
http://www.ecb.
int/stats/money/
lend/html/index.
en.html#data
http://www.
federalreserve.
gov/boarddocs/
SnLoanSurvey/
http://www.lb.lt/
eng/economy/
fi nancial_stability/
fi nsurvey.htm
http://www.nbp.
com.pl/Homen.
aspx?f=en/
SystemFinansowy/
kredytowy2008.
html